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In the Supretne Court of the
State of Utah

LAMAR H. CARLSON and
BE'ITY M. CARLSON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.

CASE
NO. 8634

W. L. HAMILTON and
ESTELLA HAMILTON, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In October, 1952, the plaintiffs and defendants entered
into a real estate contract for the purchase of land and
personal property consisting of machinery and water stock.
That the :plaintiffs agreed to pay the defendants for the
purchase of said property $22,000.00, with a down payment
of $5,000.00 and payments of $1,000.00 a year commencing
on January 1, 1954, and each year thereafter until the balance of the purchase price together with interest was paid
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(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). That the plaintiffs received possession of the property- in March, 1953, and immediately
-placed a tenant thereon. The contract also contained the
provision that upon failure to make any payments when
the same shall become due, the seller shall, as his option, be
released from all obligations in law and equity to convey
said property, and ·all payments which have been made
theretofore on this contract by the buyer shall be forfeited
to the seller as liquidated damages for the non-performance
of the contract, and the buyer agrees that the seller may,
as ·his option, re-enter and take possession of said premises without legal process (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). That the said
plaintiffs made the payment of January 1, 1954, consisting
of $1,000.00 payment on the purchase price and $680.00
interest (Tr. 6). That the payment due on January 1, 1~,
of $1,000.00 on the principal and $640.00 interest was- not
paid (Tr. 9). On the 20th day of December, 1954, one of
the pl~tiffs herein, Lamar Carlson, came to the home of
the defendants herein and told them that he could not make
the payments. The defendant, W. L. Hamilton, told Mr.
Carlson that if he would pay the back taxes, water assess-

ment and pay the interest that Mr. Hamilton would forget
the principal for the time being. Thereafter Mr. Hamilton
went to Salt Lake City in January, 1955, and saw Mr. Carlson again, who informed Mr. Hamilton that he couldn't
make payments and would have to let the place go back
(Tr. 85). Thereafter, son1etime in January or February
of 1955, Mr. Hamilton sent an unsie,oned notice through the
mail to Mr. Carlson, informing him that he had placed
no trespass signs around the fann. That at that time Mr.
Carlson had no tenant on the farm nor anybody else to
look after it. Thereafter the plaintiffs filed suit against the
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defendants .for money had and received, alleging that the
contract's forfeiture clause be declared a penalty clause
and return the money paid to the defendants back to the
plaintiffs. The defendants denied the plaintiffs' allegations
and asked the court to .construe the forfeiture clause as
being liquidated damages and dismissing the plaintiffs'
claim. The defendants ·counterclaimed for their damages
herein. Trial was held on the 30tn day of July, 1956, at
which time the court awarded the plaintiffs judgment.
STATEMENT OY POINTS

POINT
f/ , ~

1:-

THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND
CONSTRUING
THE FORFEITURE CLAUSE AS· BEING"--_.
A PENALTY INSTEAD OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.
..

.

.

POINTlt
THAT THE_ COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING-DEFENDANTS A NEW TRIAL.
ARGUMENT

POINT _1
THAT TH·E COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND
CONSTR;UING THE FORFEITURE CLAUSE AS BEING
~ PENALTY INSTEAD OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.
That the plaintiff to recover in this suit must show that
the ·forfeiture in said contract was a pen·alty and not for
liquidated damages. The plaintiff having the burden of

proof.
The plaintiffs purchased from the defendants, farm
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land, house, machinery and a water right. The purchase
price was. $22,000.00·, with $5,000.00 as a down payment.
The payments on the balance of the. purchase price were
to be $1,000.00 a year, together with interest as sown on
the· contract. One payment of $1,000.00, together with
interest in the sum of $680.00, was paid; that thereafter
the plaintiffs defaulted in their payments, as well as becoming delinquent in taxes, water as....~ents and insurance, which were part of the contract. The plaintiffs received possession of the -property in March, 1953, although
the contract was executed in October, 1952. The plaintiffs immediately placed a tenant upon the property to look
after it.
The first well recognized principle of law that we are
faced with is that equity abhors a forfeiture, and the law
does not favor it. Therefore, the nem step in deciding
whether the forfeiture clause in the contract was a penalty
or liquidated damages are the cases decided in Utah, and
the Court ·has stated on occasion that each case should be
decided on its own facts. That no hard, fast rules can be
laid down.
That on the problem in front of us the American La\v

Report, Annotated, 6 ALR 2d, at page 1403, has this to
say:

"The ultimate questions dependent upon a d~ter
mination of whether a particular contractual provision
is to be regarded as one for liquidated damages, on the
one hand, or as one for a pellalty, on the other, are
many and various. If the clause is one for a penalty
it may, if oppressive or unconscionable, be considered
Wlenforceable, with the result that the defaulting party
is liaJble for the actual damages suffered by the other
party, whether they are more or less than the sum
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5
mentioned in the stipulation. On the other hand, a
provision for liquidated damages is normally considered valid and enforceable, with the result that the
sum mentioned may ~be recovered upon a ·breach of the
agreement even if it exceeds the amount of the actual
damages suffered.''
With the above principal in mind, I shall now take up
the two Utah cases which have been decided, as follows:
Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P 2d 446, and Cole vs. Parker, 300
p· 2d 623.

In the Perkins vs. Spencer case, the Court said:
"It will be observed that in all cases where the stipu-

lation for liqudated damages was enforced it bore some
reasonable relation to the actual damages which. could
reasonably be anticipated at the time the contract was
made and was not a forfeiture which would allow an
UllConscionahle and exhorbitant recovery.''
In the Cole vs. Parker case, the Court said:
"In the absence of fraud or imposition to parties to a
contract are boWld by the price or value that they have
agreed on and such price must be paid notwithstanding
it may be excessive."

Restatement of Contracts Rule 339 has this on the
problem:
"An agreement made in advance of breach fixing the
damages therefore is not enforcealble as a COfl!tract and
does not affect the damages recoverable for a breach
unless:
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of the just compensation for the harm that
is caused by the ·breach.
(b)

The hann that is caused by the breach
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is one that is incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation.''
The cases staJte that the compensation so fixed must
be reasonaJble ·at the time of the execution of the contract.
That the contract in the present case was a lump sum price
for real estate, house and personal property. 'Tilat the parties to the.contract could reasonably forecast that a breach
of the ~ntract would cause the sellers to be damages 41 the
amount fixed as the stipulated ~orfeiture. That the down
payment was less than 25% of the total purchase price.
That if you determine that the said plaintiffs were in possession for a period in excess of two years, the total persentage would ~be 12:Y2 %. Thus we see that the amount
fiixed is a reasonably forecast of the just compensation for
the ·harm that was caused ·by the breach.
Another rule or construction as laid down in American
Law Reports, Annotated, 6 ALR 2d, at page 1429, is as follows:

''The rule of construction that if the actual daniages
probably resulting from a breach of a contract are uncertain in amount and difficult to ascertain or prove,
a provision in the contract as to the payment of a
designated sum upon a breach will prima facie be .construed as one for liquidated damages."
That in our case this principle would apply inasmuch
as the kinds and classes of property are different and that
the actual ascertainment of damages cannot definitely be
ascertained.
The plaintiffs herein being the purchasers of the property defaulted in the payment of the instalments and made
no effort at all to continue on with the contract. The plain-
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tiffs did not return all the personal property listed on the
contract to the defendants herein. That the plaintiffs do
not come into Court with clean hands to assert their rights.
POINT 2
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
D·EFENDANTS A NEW TRIAL.
The defendants herein at the conclusion of the trial
moved for a new trial based upon Rule 59 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure based upon the following grounds:
"(a)

Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61,
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any
of the following causes; provided however, that
on a motion for a ne wtri·al in an action tried
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional
testimony, amend findings of fact and conclu~
sions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(4)

Newly discovered evidence, material
for the party making the application,
which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produce
at the trial.

(6)

Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or
that it is against the law.''

The defendants filed an affidavit made by a person well
acquainted wirth the price of favm ground in the vicinity
of the Hamilton farm. That at the time of trial the defend-.
ant did not know or with diligence could not guard against
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the possibility that said evidence would become material.
That rtlhe evidence did not become material until after the
Court had ruled on the case.
The defendants further contend that no evidence at
all was introduiced art the trial to justify the verdict. That
in the evidence adduced at the trial there was nothing to
justify the Court to ronstrue the forfeiture clause as a penalty both in law and fact.
CONCLUSION
'Dhere is no justification in law or in fact for the findings and decree of the Court, and the same should be reversed or remanded for a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN S. McALLISTER
PAUL J. MERR~L
Attorneys for Appellants
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